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1. McCallion’s Proposed Diagnosis and Treatment of Undergraduate Attrition in Philosophy 
 
The primary aim of McCallion’s paper is twofold: 1) To outline two concepts that may help 
explain the high rates of undergraduate attrition by women (and other “marginalized 
groups”) from philosophy, and 2) To offer suggestions for lowering these rates of attrition. 
McCallion’s proposal is insightful and her suggestions are worthy of further exploration. 
While I agree with much of what McCallium has to say, I suspect that at least some of the 
problems that she highlights may not be peculiar to philosophy as such. While I won’t have 
much to say about that, I do have some concerns with McCallion’s account, and will suggest 
that at least some of the issues that she highlights may also be bound up with problems and 
presuppositions that exist as a broader socio-political level that may not be covered by her 
proposed diagnosis and treatment. 
 If I understand McCallion’s argument correctly, then her central claim seems to be 
that the high rates of “women’s attrition from the discipline of philosophy” may be a 
function of two core problems that, when combined with situations “stereotype threat”, 
results in students becoming ‘alienated’ from philosophy. The core problems in question 
are what McCallion calls: 1) Disassociated disagreement, and 2) Extracted speech. In the 
first case a student is presented with some philosophical claim, position, question, etc. with 
which she disagrees (intuitively—we’ll come back to this later). Unfortunately, the student 
in question lacks the appropriate ‘means’ or ‘resources’ to properly articulate this 
disagreement. Because she is a member of a marginalized group that is subject to 
stereotype threat, i.e. the student misidentifies this ‘absence of means’ by reinterpreting it 
through the lens of the now internalized stereotype of ‘women’. This misinterpretation of 
her experience leads her to conclude that the issue at hand (and hence ‘philosophy’ as 
such) is beyond her ability to understand. The student ends up mistakenly concluding that 
philosophy is ‘not for her’ and so switches to another major (to put it crudely). 
2 
 
 The second problem is related to the first, but with an added twist. Here the student 
is already in a state of disassociated disagreement, but now her efforts to ‘do philosophy’ 
are thwarted even further by pressures of various sorts which urge her to ‘game’ the 
system, if you will, by writing philosophical papers and addressing philosophical questions 
in a manner that will satisfy the expectations of the authorities involves (e.g. the tutor or 
Professor). This is accomplished simply by following some well-worn formula or ‘recipe’, 
e.g. the typical ‘research-paper’ model which places a strong emphasis on the inclusion of 
multiple citations from multiple sources (primary and secondary), and where the questions 
or issues posed are addressed following a well-established argumentative structure. Rather 
than engaging with the material in question in a thoughtful, reflective, philosophical 
manner, the student ends up following the ‘paper-writing formula’ that is typical for that 
kind of philosophy course (or that kind of philosophy Professor), ‘plugging’ key terms or 
phrases into the formula here and there, terms or phrases which the student does not 
actually understand but which she is skillful enough (as a language user) to string together 
in a grammatically correct manner. The result is a paper which the student herself doesn’t 
understand, but which nevertheless gives the appearance of understanding because it 
follows the accepted essay-writing formula or recipe in question. McCallion calls this kind 
of product extracted speech, claiming that it takes place more often when students from 
marginalized groups take courses where the material being covered and the methods being 
employed are not diverse and flexible enough to ‘resonate’ or ‘connect’ with such students.  
 McCallion’s proposals for helping to alleviate these potential problems operate at 
two levels: 1) The departmental level, and 2) The individual level. At the departmental level 
she suggests making efforts to diversify the content covered in specific courses so that they 
include a wide range of “approaches, methods and traditions” as well as “outlooks” that are 
taught in a fair and even manner throughout the course (e.g. instead of being ‘tagged on’ at 
the end). Identifying such diversity of content in course syllabi, claims McCallion, may help 
students to more readily identify philosophy as something that ‘speaks’ to their interests, 
backgrounds, points of view, and so on. In addition to this, McCallion also suggests that the 
evaluative component of courses be broadened beyond the “mainstream” model of the 
‘well-cited research paper,’ to include opportunities for students to explore more 
“innovative” and academically risky approaches to philosophical questions.  
At the individual level, McCallion offers three suggestions: 1) Educate students 
about potential problems posed by disassociated disagreement and extracted speech, 2) 
Encourage students to read viewpoints that are critical of the position or claim with which 
they are struggling, and 3) Train tutors, teaching assistants, and so on, to encourage 
creative responses in students, e.g. by pointing them to readings that similar in some 
relevant sense to the position that they may be struggling to express. 
 
2. Some Modest Observations and Suggestions 
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I confess that I enjoyed reading McCallion’s paper. I learned a lot and not only found myself 
agreeing with many of her points, but also found myself reflecting upon her ideas for some 
time afterwards. Still, there are some aspects of McCallion’s paper that I do confess to 
finding a little troubling. I suspect (or at least hope) that McCallion might be able to ease 
most if not all of my concerns if given the chance to further elaborate and detail her 
account, but I will voice them nonetheless.  
The first has to do with her suggestion that course syllabi should include a wider 
diversity of approaches, methods, traditions and outlooks than has traditionally been the 
case. Now I can see this working well in introductory level and intermediary level courses, 
where the aim is to introduce students to philosophy, or to same selected range of topics in 
philosophy, etc. But at upper level or senior level undergraduate courses (which are often, 
but not always, much narrower in scope), including a wide array of approaches, methods, 
traditions and outlooks in the syllabi may actually defeat the purpose of such courses (at 
least in some cases). This is particularly the case in more ‘advanced’ upper level courses 
where the primary aim may be to examine the work of some particular philosopher or 
‘school’ of thought in some depth (e.g. with an exclusive focus on primary texts). In 
teaching such courses one may, of course, (perhaps even should) include references to 
various, perhaps competing interpretations of the work being studied, but to include such 
references (which often arise spontaneously in the context of some particular class or 
discussion) in the syllabus itself seems a little unrealistic. One might try to alleviate these 
kinds of issues by ensuring that there are also other courses at the upper level that have 
greater breadth of scope (to balance things out, as it were), but trying to build these kinds 
of ‘forced constraints’ into a curriculum that also includes respect for academic freedom 
(on the part of Professors or Instructors) would be a difficult balancing act. 
 My second concern has to do with McCallion’s proposal for diversifying the range of 
assessments in a given course to provide students with the opportunity to better ‘explore’ 
alternative philosophical pathways beyond the mainstream ‘well-cited research paper.’ 
While I agree that it is absolutely vital that students be encouraged to engage with 
questions, issues, and so on in a genuine, philosophical manner (this is, after all, what 
philosophy students should be learning to do, and hopefully doing better as they advance 
through their degree), the pressures to satisfy pre-established expectations and standards 
extends not only to students, but to the professors and instructors of those courses as well. 
Departments, for example, often have to satisfy the expectations and standards set by 
broader governing bodies. These governing bodies in turn often have to satisfy the 
expectations and standards set by governments, industry, or some other external 
‘authority’ that might be funding such programs. The pressures to ‘perform,’ which in many 
societies often means having one’s work measured against some market-based metric, are 
often so extensive and ubiquitous that it is difficult to say where they begin and where they 
end. Thus, the pressures to follow mainstream models of assessment may themselves be 
difficult to counter in an effective way, especially in large classes where the range of viable 
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evaluation methods may be limited. Further, the pressure that students face to ‘game’ the 
system is, to a large extent, created and sustained by the system itself, viewed in a very 
broad sense. While course syllabi that only include the ‘well-cited research paper’ as their 
main assessment tool may invite or encourage this kind of activity, one must also keep in 
mind that the pressures to game the system come from a multitude of sources, e.g. the ways 
in which we distribute students awards, the ways in which we measure and evaluate 
teaching (which may encourage the ‘teacher’ to choose assessments that will better 
guarantee good teaching scores) and, more broadly, the ways in which student attitudes, 
attention, judgment and general ‘ways-of-seeing’ are shaped by the broader social, political, 
educational and other forces that shape our current manner of being-in-the-world. What 
I’m suggesting here, I suppose, is that when philosophy students ‘game’ a course by writing 
the well-cited research paper in a manner meant to assuage the evaluator’s expectations, 
this need not be evidence of disassociated disagreement in the students in question. Many 
cases of this kind of extracted speech may actually be the result of pressures and forces 
that are different from disassociated disagreement, and while we should definitely keep an 
eye out for evidence of the latter (and try to counter it as best we can whenever we suspect 
it), we should also keep in mind that the rote, formulaic strategies students employ may 
have little to do with the particular approaches, methods, traditions, and outlooks that are 
being covered in the course. Identifying cases where extracted forms of speech are a 
function of disassociated disagreement might also be difficult, especially in large classes 
where the opportunities for individual interaction with students may be limited. I suspect 
that McCallion would likely agree with these points but thought it worth making them 
more explicit than one might otherwise be able to do in a conference paper of the sort that 
she has presented here.  
 My third concern is with McCallion’s account of what she calls extracted speech. 
First, what she identifies as extracted speech does not appear to be different in kind from 
the general sort of ‘formulaic,’ ‘rote’ format that many students follow in the writing of an 
essay or the answering of a question on a test. I have seen many examples of this kind of 
paper over the years, and I would suggest that this kind of rote, extracted speech is a 
familiar feature of academic life in general that is not unique to philosophy as such. It is a 
strategy that learn to develop and master (and in some cases are even taught to employ) in 
the general course of their educational development. Hence this kind of strategy is 
something that most if not all students are always already familiar with well before they 
take any course in philosophy. It is something that I would suggest most students do most 
of them time, almost by default—and this is the important point here. In my own 
experience, at least, this kind of default way of seeing, thinking, writing, and so on is so 
prevalent that one has to continuously warn students against it when trying to get them to 
think philosophically. In many cases, this kind of automatic, rote way of responding to a 
question or issues is so deeply entrenched that students don’t know what it means to 
‘think’ in a genuine, critical sense. Given this, I’m not sure it’s so easy to tell when a student 
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is writing as they are because they are experiencing disassociated disagreement, and when 
they are simply falling back on old habits and ways-of-doing, as it were. 
 My fourth point has to do with McCallion’s account of disassociated disagreement. 
She seems to suggest that disassociated disagreement only arises in marginalized groups. 
Now I don’t know if I count as a member of a marginalized group (I’m a white male from a 
mixed Irish/English background who was raised in what we might broadly classify as a 
‘poor’ household), but I recall having many experiences of the sort she describes, both as a 
student and as a professional academic. Even now there are some topics, subject matters, 
problems, philosophers, etc. that leave me silent, haunted by feelings of inadequacy or 
incompetence of the sort she describes (and which in many cases I was later able to 
articulate as a disagreement that I had with the position in question, but one that I only 
learned to articulate over time). This raises two questions for me about McCallion’s 
account. The first has to do with the sense of ‘marginalization’ that is being outlined here. 
There are, I would suggest, lots of ways in which one can be ‘marginalized.’ When McCallion 
uses that term, I suspect that she is using it in something like a political, social, or economic 
sense, as a matter of marginalized political ‘power’ for example. In at least some of the 
cases of disassociated disagreement that I’ve experienced, however, I don’t think the 
marginalization in question was of a political or social kind (at least not in the ordinary 
sense of those terms). It was more like a sense of marginalization that comes with ‘not 
being in the know,’ that is, of not being familiar with a certain set of background conditions, 
assumptions, presuppositions, etc., background conditions that the author or people 
involved (e.g. at a conference) were so familiar with that they could simply ‘take them for 
granted’ as elements which enabled a ‘higher level’ of discussion that I was simply unable 
to follow (I sometimes get this feeling when reading certain scholastic writers, for 
example). I suggest that in at least some cases the marginalization that gives rise to the 
experience of disassociated disagreement that McCallion is highlighting is not political, 
social, or economic in the normal sense of that term, but is of a more conceptual or 
‘linguistic’ character (for lack of a better term). To frame it in Wittgenstein’s terms, such 
marginalization may result from being exposed to a specialized ‘language game’ that we 
have not yet learned how to adequately play. Or as Latour might put it, it is a mode of being 
to which we have not become properly attuned, making our thinking ‘out of key’ with the 
philosopher that one is studying, or the topic being discussed. This brings me to my second 
point, namely, that in some cases the resources needed to properly orient oneself in such 
cases may require more than simply exposure to some alternative approach, method, 
tradition, and so on as McCallion suggests. In some cases reorientation may be something 
that can only be accomplished through a sufficient amount of experience over a broad 
range of time. In such cases there may not be any shortcuts (e.g. read this, and then you’ll 
‘get it’), but only the need to keep working through it until enough experience has been 
accumulated to bring the issue in question into the right light, as it were. Plato hinted at 
this. So too did Kant when he suggested that certain kinds of questions could only truly be 
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addressed after one had turned 40 (I believe Plato thought one had to be even older than 
this). This is not an idea that I can fully develop here, but merely something that I am 
‘throwing out there’ for further consideration.  
 My final concern is with McCallum’s appeal to what she calls a student’s “organic 
intuitions.” While I think I understand what she is pointing to here, she never really 
explains what she means by this (and similar phrases), and this lack of clarity may lead 
some to misinterpret this language. What McCallion means by this, I take it, is that when a 
student is experiencing disassociated disagreement, she lacks the proper resources to 
adequately articulate her disagreement with the philosophical ideas, claims, position, and 
so on in question. The “ineffability of their confusion” (a lovely phrase) results not only in 
the student feeling “lost”, but she is also silenced in a way that leaves her unable to call for 
help. It is when in this state that a student’s “organic intuitions” have a vital role to play, for 
they provide her with some means of anchoring her experience and reorienting herself 
again so as to begin the difficult task of learning how to articulate the grounds of her ‘felt’ 
disagreement. If this is what McCallion means (or something like this) then it is an 
important aspect of her account. The problem is that such language as: “develop their 
organic intuitions,” “write the philosophy we wanted to read,” “a way of doing philosophy 
that they can identify with,” and other analogous expressions can be interpreted in a 
negative manner that simply reinforces a student’s present ideas, concepts, beliefs, ways-
of-seeing, and so on. It’s not that I think McCallum’s account is mistaken or wrong, it’s just 
that she doesn’t emphasize enough, I would suggest, the vital role that critique, and 
especially self-critique plays in philosophical thought (or at least in philosophical reflection 
as I understand it). While all philosophical reflection must begin wherever we happen to 
find ourselves, with whatever ideas, beliefs, ways-of-seeing, and so on, we happen to be 
working from, such reflection should not simply take that starting point as true in any 
absolute sense, e.g. as something to be settled within and reinforced. It seems to me that 
genuine philosophical reflection should also include a critical moment that involves the 
questioning and ‘self-critique’ of our present ‘intuitions’ as well, whatever they happen to 
be. It may turn out that after such critical reflection we end up accepting our original 
intuitions, but anchoring ourselves in our intuitions in any strong sense should only come 
after a period of rigorous and honest critical reflection has already been undertaken. While 
I suspect that McCallion might agree with this (as the account of her ‘mathematical’ friends 
development suggests), I think the kind of genuine philosophical engagement that she is 
trying to promote here might benefit by placing more emphasis on this critical aspect of 
philosophical thought. 
 I will end with a few modest suggestions. Philosophy Departments come in a variety 
of sizes and ‘schools.’ Not only this, but undergraduate courses in those departments also 
vary quite a lot, depending especially on the kind and level (or year) of the course in 
question. McCallion might benefit from tailoring at least some of her proposals so that they 
take into account some of these differences. For example, diversity of content in a syllabus 
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may be more important at lower level courses than in upper level ones. It might also be 
more important in ‘topics-oriented’ courses rather than courses of a highly specialized or 
focused character. The need to include a more diverse range of content in course syllabi 
may be greater in smaller Departments than in larger ones, for larger Departments would 
likely include a broad range of Professors who, between them, actually ‘do philosophy’ in 
very diverse ways. Students in such institutions would have a greater chance of being 
exposed to different approaches, methods, traditions and so on, simply by taking courses 
with a variety of different professors (until they find one who has “a way of doing 
philosophy that they can identify with”). In smaller Departments, however, or in 
Departments whose members generally share in a more homogeneous approach, method, 
etc. of doing philosophy, then it may be more important to incorporate greater diversity 
into the syllabi of those courses in the way that McCallion suggests. There are likely a host 
of other contextual considerations that might be relevant here, but these are the ones that 
come to my mind for the time being. 
 As I said at the beginning, I enjoyed reading McCallion’s paper and learned a great 
deal from it. I think her proposed diagnosis of disassociated disagreement and extracted 
speech, as important contributing factors in the high levels of attrition by women (and 
other marginalized groups) from philosophy, is not only plausible, but worthy of further 
consideration, exploration and testing. I encourage her to continue developing her project, 
refining and revising it as needed (as happens with any good hypothesis). 
